Sharp Knives on 40ft poles and tubs of water – IED response in the 1930s

I came across this edition of “Popular Mechanics” from July 1932 with a couple of interesting IED related articles – the first is the invention of a postal x-ray machine for IED detection, and then a longer article on IEDs including some postal IEDs that killed an amateur bomb tech, working with a sharp knife on the end of a 40 ft pole.  Also detailed is an IED that was placed in a tub of water in Milwaukee police headquarters – it detonated, killing 14 policemen.  On page 110 there’s also interesting reference to biometrics on IEDs, and the exploitation of evidence from them.

The article also makes reference to the famous New York Bomb Disposal expert Owen Eagen who died of natural causes in 1920 after a career where he is said to have dealt with over 7000 IEDs – a good indicator that New York was once a hotbed of anarchists and criminals who very often resorted to IEDs. I’m currently researching Eagen’s efforts as an early bomb tech and will blog on this in the future. Suffice for now to say there were more than 125 IED incidents in New York between January and October 1913.

Things you can’t do in a bomb suit.

Well, you see, I try and make the titles grab attention. Sorry. This post is another in the “cognitive psychology” theme.   I’m becoming more certain that both “System 1” cognition, developed by experience and training, and System 2 cognition, careful slower pace thought, have key roles to play. At certain times in certain operations one or other is more important. In high intensity, high tempo operations, System 1 must be optimized – it is optimized by training and by experience and experience of others can help in developing appropriate SOPs  and the monitoring of “system 1 “ EOD activities by experienced commanders/ mentors.

When a System 1 approach fails or the nature of the IED is unknown, a System 2 approach is needed. It’s at this point that I think my concern is focused, because I have seen operators struggle at this point and probably did struggle myself too on occasions.  I really think the mind fools itself at this point, potentially, and it’s hard to switch from “One” to “Two” and then be certain you have switched.  Also on an operation it’s difficult to develop the optimal circumstances such that your mind can “switch”.  An example:

Here are some simple System 1 examples:

2+ 2 = ?

Bread and ?

Your answers are all instinctive, you don’t need to think about it.  Let me now give you what is likely a System 2 problem:

23 x 17 = ?

Ok you have to think about that but most of us (!) could probably do that in our heads – it might take 10 or 20 seconds. That’s your system 2 working.

Now , an experiment. Stand up from your desk, and start jogging on the spot reasonably vigorously. After ten seconds try and compute 31 x 27 in your head, while jogging. Do it now.

OK so I bet you had to stop jogging to do it. This demonstrates that you physically cannot do “System 2” thinking while actively physically engaged in something else.  This means you cannot do “System 2” threat assessments while in a bomb suit working towards a suspect IED, carrying tools, weapons and clearing your way working on absorbing your surrounding environment. You can only do System 2 threat assessments in the ease and comfort of your ICP, without other distractions.  I think that’s quite important. If you think you can do System 2 threat assessments while working in your EOD suit you are fooling yourself, and the mind is easily fooled. Interestingly there is a physiological activity that can be spotted when the brain is engaged in “System 2” and that is a dilation of the pupils, but that’s not practical to monitor.  I’m also finding some interesting other hints – System 2 is also adversely affected, directly, by low blood sugar levels.

So for now, here is what I recommend:

A.  Discipline yourself to encourage “System 2” analysis if the task demands it. It is probably demanded if you do not know the nature of the IED or if an SOP  action fails to have the desired effect or if something unexpected occurs.

B. Be “self aware” of the likelihood that you will fool yourself  and actually use System 1 thinking when you think you are doing System 2. Know that if you are in your bomb suit down range you CANNOT be doing System 2. If you find something unexpected return to the ICP to think about it. A personal bug bear now which is comms while in a bomb suit. I abhor this as it simply doesn’t help, it extends the time of the operator is in the danger zone, and if the operator is providing commentary on what he is seeing HE or SHE IS NOT THINKING. Every time I see this used, I never see the value, it simply is pointless, dangerous effort.

C. Maximize your System 2 potential by finding time and space in your ICP , uninterrupted by other things such as comms, equipment prep etc. Other people do that , not because it is not important but because it is important that the operator has time to think. If an operator is preparing equipment, that’s a bad sign.

D. Commanders, recognise the adverse effect of fatigue on system 2 thinking. There is clinical evidence to show the consequences of fatigue on this aspect of cognitive performance.

E. Eat a bar of chocolate on your way to a task to keep your blood sugar level up. (!)

So …nothing startling there for many but perhaps some reinforcement of current drills, and some reasons why some current drills work. But more to come which I think will be new techniques to encourage System 2 cognitive processes where there are some seeds of ideas developing in my little head…

X-raying IEDs – in the 1890s

I’m grateful to my colleagues Leslie Payne and Greg Woolgar for pointing me in the direction of early attempts at X-raying IEDs in France at the end of the 19th century.  Below are some examples of IEDs and x-ray images which seem to be derived from  “The Manual of the perfect Anarchist”, a French publication being circulated in anarchist groups at the time.

First device – A booby-trapped box, containing a glass ampoule of sulphuric acid placed in a sugar/potassium chlorate mix. The acid is released when the box lid is opened, because a thread attached to the base of the lid releases the ampoule enclosure somehow (my French language skills are not quite good enough for a clear translation…) Note the presence of shrapnel, which look like hobnails.

 

 

 

2. In the second box  a thread on the lid again breaks the sulphuric acids ampoule as it is opened. Note the nails as well as the pins which fasten the wooden box together.  Again the main charge is sugar chlorate

Although both these devices contained sugar chlorate mixes, a common explosive used as a main charge at the time was mercury fulminate – not an easy material to make and construct an IED of.

Old and bold

I came across this while researching… in a German manuscript dated 1572. I think it’s the earliest EOD tool I have come across.  Nearly as old as some of the readers of this blog.

 

 

Hocus Pocus

A worrying article on IED fatalities in Thailand here.   Try using the power of google on GT200 explosives.     Draw your own conclusions.

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