Description of 1944 Render Safe

I’m taking a bit of a gamble with this story. Usually the stuff I post is out of copyright. The excerpts below are from a book published in 1977 by the then Lord Rothschild.  I have contacted his estate to seek permission to quote this small excerpt but received no reply. I think this story is worth telling and shows the man in a good light so I’m going to take a chance and copy some images here.  I will remove if anyone objects and make a donation to a suitable charity if it causes concern.

Lord Rothschild (1910-1990) was one of those larger than life characters, a real polymath if lived a life to the full.

During WW2 he worked for MI5, advising on the vulnerability of British industry to sabotage, and in one or two other related “spooky” activities related to explosives, much of which there is little or no public record of.   In 1944 there were some sabotage devices sent from Spain, I think, to the UK hidden in cases of onions. One arrived, somehow in Northampton and Lord Rothschild went  to deal with this German sabotage device which used 21 day timers.  I have no other details of this German operation.  Below is an extract from Rothschilds telephone conversation with his secretary as he rendered the device safe.  It reminded me very much of the Earl of Suffolk, another Lord involved in Bomb Disposal in the Second World War who I have written about before – he too conducted his RSPs while talking to his secretary on a field telephone.

I understand that it was mainly for this operation that Lord Rothschild was awarded the GM. Good job.  No doubt his secretary then asked “So, how do you think that went?”

 

This excerpt is from “Meditations of a Broomstick” By Lord Rothschild, published in 1977 by Collins.

 

 

 

When EOD Innovation Goes Wrong

Here’s the interesting tale, from 1879 about a the disposal of explosives that went tragically wrong, despite the method being developed by one of the top explosive scientists in the country.  At some point during the year, 12,000 detonators were imported illegally into England.  They had been labeled “percussion caps”. For a while they were put in storage and after some discussion were sent for disposal, the procedure to be used being an innovative one that perhaps had not been tried fully and limits set.

Here’s an extract from a report on the matter:

Useful lesson here – what might work theoretically as a scientific, chemical disposal method for one detonator doesn’t necessarily apply to a larger quantity. Having said that I’d say the method was a bit weird at the most perfect of times.  The report above was extracted from the annual report (1879) of the Chief Inspector of Explosives, Major Majendie – an absolute treasure trove of information about the management of explosives, and the investigation of explosive incidents at this time in history. The reports, by Major Majendie and his co-inspector Major Ford, assisted by Dr DuPre are professional, technically sound and beautifully written.   It also shows that the UK MOD were assisting the police in the recovery and disposal of explosives all the way back then – something 11 EOD Regiment are involved in today – modern Ammunition Technicians being direct descendants of the Woolwich Royal Laboratory staff.

The Russian IED connection

Last year I wrote two important blog pieces. The first was about the Russian IED expert Ilya Starinov – certainly the most important person in the history of explosive sabotage.  The second post was about the Russian F-10 radio controlled demolition device, used successfully by Starinov in WW2.

Since than I have been digging to find more details of Starinov’s devices, which I have finally successfully done, and there are some very interesting findings.    I’ve also uncovered other anecdotal stuff about Starinov and indeed about the broader history of IEDs which I’ll post in coming days and weeks.  I also have more technical detail on the F-10 to discuss in future posts.

Now, firstly, a caution. Some of the material I have found regarding the construction and design of certain IEDs could be abused by people with ill-intent. All the material I am going to post is unclassified, but I’m going to obscure parts of it and discuss things in some vague terms  to make it much less useful to those with criminal intent.  If you want to know the source and you know me or can prove you have a legitimate need to see the sources I am using, then get in touch. Otherwise I make no apology for being deliberately non-specific about some of this material. Now, I found the source of this material on line, and others may be able too, but I am going to limit my helpfulness towards those who shouldn’t have this detail.  If you want to challenge my assessments and why I draw the conclusions I reach below, I’m very happy to do this off-line.  This means, perhaps, you are going to have to trust me on some of my assessments. Or not!  Finally I should also point out, sadly, that there is no shortage of detailed technical instructions for miscreants to find how to make bigger and better IEDs then these here discussed in an openly available 70-year-old document, discussing devices from the Eastern Front in 1942.  The horse of IED knowledge bolted a long time ago.  Close the stable door if you can – I can’t.

The document I found was developed not from Russian sources, but from US sources, who clearly in the immediate post-war period of 1945-1950 had access to German Wehrmacht engineers reports. These engineers had conducted thousands of successful EOD operations. By gleaning reports of Soviet demolition activity, dealt with by the German engineers in WW2, the US military tried to gain a greater understanding of Soviet capabilities in the 1950s. So this was real technical intelligence on Soviet explosive technology, and explosive sabotage tactics, as the Cold War span up.  So here we have, in 2020, the opportunity to examine 1950s US military technical intelligence, derived from Nazi German technical intelligence from the period 1940-1945, about Russian explosive devices.  So this isn’t exactly a primary source.  But some of the detail I’m going to show you makes me convinced this is worthwhile, valuable historical material, and there are certain aspects which surprised me.

Firstly to remind you of the context. It is apparent that the Soviet soldier of WW2 was pretty familiar with improvising explosives charges, either using his own munitions or captured German munitions. The Germans state that the Russian soldier is “particularly ingenious in installing improvised mines and booby traps“. During the latter part of WW2, the Russian use of sabotage explosive devices went way beyond anything seen before or since. Furthermore partisans in Eastern European countries were trained to improvise yet further. Thousands of railway lines, trains and vehicles were attacked explosively by Russians or Russian sponsored partisans in eastern Europe. Much of this was coordinated by Ilya Starinov, who also designed explosive devices , trained the perpetrators and on many occasions planted key devices himself. Starinov survived numerous purges, and went on to develop spetzntaz units and tactics, and taught revolutionaries around the world in the 1950s and 1960s.

In this first post, I’m going to highlight some very interesting similarities between Soviet sabotage devices from WW2 and (get this) IRA devices of the 1970’s, 1980’s and even 1990’s.  These similarities go beyond just application of general explosive/sabitage principles – there are significant design similarities in aspects of the devices.  Here’s some examples, and a final, highly technical device that I won’t comment on too deeply.

  1. Firstly there is the use of specific component items.  In the 1970s and into the 1990s, many PIRA devices encountered in the UK had firing or arming switches as part of the circuitry. In the vast majority of cases, in what was termed “Time and Power Units” (TPUs) this switch consisted of an adapted wooden springed clothes peg help open with a wooden dowel. Here’s a demonstration circuit showing the “IRA technique”.
  2. The clothes peg was wired so that a switch closed when an insulator was removed from the jaws of the peg, arming this device. In the 1950 document I have found. German engineers describe this exact concept being found in Russian devices in the early 1940s. Here’s a pic:  

3. In the late 1980s, PIRA developed the “Mk 12” mortar as British Forces called it. This was followed in 1993 by the smaller “Mk16” Mortar. These were missiles that had a shaped charge in its front end, a hollow pipe behind it containing a fuze and tail fins to stabilise in flight.  This wasn’t really a mortar but a horizontally fired missile typically fired at vehicles. It had a shaped charge warhead and a fuze set in the hollow tube behind, with simple fns to stabilise  it in its short flight.  Here’s  a picture of a PIRA Mk 12 Mortar. disassembled:

4. In WW2 Russian partisans developed a device that is remarkably similar. Not tube-launched but built for a similar purpose and with almost identical design principles. Here’s the pic from the 1950 report:

5.  The Russians also concentrated significantly on additional circuits or mechanisms to booby trap charges. By introducing anti-handling and anti-lift charges, several of the devices used by the Soviets appear remarkably similar to what the British EOD community of the 1970’s refer to as “Castlerobin” devices. I’m not going to discuss this further here. But clearly there is a thought-process going on to prevent the render safe of devices, and target the EOD operator. The parallels in design are clear.

6. The creation of devices which target EOD activities went a step further with the introduction of a RF sensitive switch designed to initiate an explosive device when certain mine detection equipment was used. This was fielded in December 1943.  Some of this equipment was captured by the Wehrmacht in January 1944, and rapidly exploited.  70 years later , technology which is triggered by the RF signature of certain EOD equipments would be regarded as a very high threat indeed – yet, here the Russians were in the early 1940s developing such technology. The device responded to a frequency of 800-2000Hz at short range, emitted by German EOD equipment. What is more, the Germans recognised the importance of such an advance, examined the Russian technology, identified some flaws, and developed their own version of the equipment. They also developed technical solutions to the threat.   I find that remarkable, and some of you will share my surprise for reasons we won’t go into. Here’s an excerpt from the report showing the circuit to prove it is what I say it is – (I have obscured part of it for reasons explained earlier).

To be clear in my assessments: I’m not saying that the IRA devices of the late twentieth century were designed by the Russians – just that there are some odd parallels, that may be coincidences. Direct influence is possible but so, theoretically, is the potential for the IRA to have got hold of the American report written in the 1950s. It’s not secret.  But we shouldn’t underestimate the fact that Starinov was training revolutionaries from around the world. I do think that these parallels once again highlight the importance of understanding the history of IEDs.  The fact that Russian devices were so focused on countering EOD action is interesting and significant and deserves wider understanding.  The general under-appreciation of the extensive, WW2 Russian sabotage campaigns using improvised explosive devices is barely recognised and deserves a much greater level of attention. Frankly it makes the efforts of the British SOE or American OSS look very paltry in comparison.

In future blogs related to all this I will address the following:

  1. Some Russian devices designed specifically for targeting railways – further to my series in the subject. Some were designed by Starinov himself.
  2. More technical details of the Russian F-10 radio controlled device.
  3. Some more details and photographs of Ilya Starinov, and an interesting story about the F-10 radio-controlled devices he deployed to assassinate German General General Braun in Kharkov in November 1941, and the role of a young commissar called Krushchev (yes, that one) in the operation, protecting Starinov from being arrested by Beria’s agents and “purged” before the device was detonated.
  4. An odd and fascinating series of parallels between this 1950s American report and another American report written in 1865 showing almost identical devices. History repeating itself again. Some of the Russian devices of WW2 are identical to Russian devices of the 1850s, and some other Russian devices of WW2 are very similar to American revolutionary devices of 1778.

All in all, this document is a bit of a treasure trove when put within the larger context of the history of IEDs over several centuries.

 

Senior officers and explosive investigation don’t mix

In the last few days the British Royal Navy  have announced a “large” deployment (their words not mine!) to the Baltic as part of a NATO exercise.     The reports mention that this is the largest deployment to the Baltic for 100 years.

Actually the previous deployments are pretty interesting.  If you don’t know the story of Agar VC, who tore around the Baltic in a fast torpedo boat, delivering and picking up spies for MI6, then sinking Russian cruisers, in 1919 (!)  you should read this life story here.  Jaw dropping stuff.  I have mentioned one of his WW2 exploits here, and he also took part in the Zeebrugge Raid in 1918, so he is a recurring character on this blog.  Nothing to do with explosives but the story of the sinking of HMS Dorsetshire is remarkable.

There also was a significant range of British naval operations in the Baltic during the Crimean war (1855).   I’ve mentioned this in passing in earlier posts but it’s worth revisiting.  The Russians had a major naval base on the island of Kronstadt hat was potentially a target for attack by the British Navy. The Russians deployed a fairly large number of explosive devices, tethered just below the surface of the sea on the approaches to the base, in effect an early sea mine. (Similar devices had been deployed in the Crimea and you can see a superb drawing of one here)

The British Navy on patrol in the Baltic became aware of them, and decided to investigate, sending two ships, with senior officers aboard to recover and examine the devices.

Here’s a Royal Navy diagram:

The device works when the rod A-A is struck by the side of a vessel. This rod then pushes on a glass vial of Sulphuric Acid (D-D), breaking it at the bottom. The acid drops into a container full of Potassium Chlorate (C), causing a reaction which ignites the gunpowder charge. This fuze is called a “Jacobi fuze” although in fact it was designed by Immanuel Nobel, father of Alfred Nobel.

Provided the rods aren’t pushed, (they are held by a spring), it is possible in theory to recover the mine, which is exactly what sailors from a ship carrying Admiral Seymour did. On recovering the device onto the deck of the ship it was carefully taken apart, and there was discussion amongst the officers observing how the mechanism should work.  Admiral Seymour, being a “hands-on sort of chap” worked it out an exclaimed “O no. This is the way it would go off” – and he pushed the bar A-A. The device duly functioned as intended , exploded, and knocked everyone down around it. Seymour survived but was badly injured.

 

The very next day, a ship carrying Admiral Dundas recovered a similar device. Admiral Dundas performed exactly the same trick as Admiral Seymour, the device exploded and Dundas nearly lost his sight.

Senior officers eh?

 

 

Chemical render-safe techniques for explosives -1926

I’m deep into research into Soviet explosive activity in the first half of the twentieth century but in doing so came across a very interesting Russian technical EOD procedure from 1926, developed at an incident that’s worth discussing.

In many parts of the world in the late 19th and 20th century, bridges were built with special shafts, or alcoves, designed to take explosive charges to destroy the bridge in the event of a foreign invasion as part of defensive blocking operations.  At one point in about 1926, a bridge in the Ukraine was being inspected, and engineers found a forgotten series of explosive charges in a bridge, left over from a previous conflict. It is likely that in preparation for defensive operations that never subsequently occurred, the bridge was prepared for demolition by placing large quantities of explosives in the shafts, and then for whatever reason this was forgotten.

The large charges were of dynamite and had been placed in shafts built into a bridge then covered in a thick protective layer of grease.  Because of their age, and environmental heat cycling over the years, the dynamite was exuding nitroglycerine, and was assessed as very unstable.  The engineers were tasked with removing the dynamite without detonating it.

The innovative render-safe technique developed at the scene, if I’m honest, isn’t quite 100% clear because I’m dealing with a non-technical translation, but it’s interesting for a few reasons and was apparently successful.  It went like this, or something like this, from what I can glean.

  1. Oil (I think engine oil) was slowly poured onto the protective grease, dissolving it, but leaving behind the dynamite.
  2. The engine oil was then treated with sawdust, to soak it up from the bottom of the shaft and carefully removed. My guess is that such a shaft would have a drain hole, and this may have been plugged.
  3. A warm water-based alkaline solution was then poured onto the unstable dynamite.  This isn’t a technique I’m familiar with, but the engineer responsible claims the alkaline solution in contact with nitroglycerine results in a more stable material, which was then decanted from the bottom of each bridge shaft. I don’t know volumes or timescales but the whole operation dealing with several shafts, presumably one after another, took several days. It could be that the warm alkaline solution simply washed the remaining oil from the dynamite, as the engineer seems to be concerned with the grease interacting with the exuding nitroglycerine.
  4. Finally the remaining dynamite could be removed.

Have any readers come across any elements of this render safe procedure before? Any chemists out there able to comment on the nitroglycerine / alkaline effects and products? I’m assuming that some form of hydrolysis reaction takes place but my chemistry knowledge isn’t quite strong enough in this specific case… comments very welcome. Or was something lost in translation?

There is much more fascinating Russian stuff coming soon. The explosives specialist who came up with the procedure went on to be responsible for more explosive devices than any other person in history, and I’ll be posting more stuff on him soon. In the history of IED campaigns, and associated activity I don’t think there is a more important person.

Update:

Thanks to Matyas Koszik for this comment suggesting that chemically a hydrolysis of NG makes sense:

Re:alkaline hydrolysis of nitroglycerine:
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/kin.550160808
Seems to work similarly to other ester hydrolysis reactions.

 

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