No comment.
No comment.
Interesting development reported here and elsewhere Basically a covert electronic surveillance device was discovered somehwere ‘interesting” in Iran which seemed to have had a Victim operated explosive penalty integral to it. Poses interesting theoretical challenges for security staff and potential EOD response needed to a find of a suspected surveillance device.
Reportedly similar devices were discovered over the past couple of years in Lebanon, monitoring phone lines, and an associated explosive incident occurred, but it’s not entirely clear if the explosion in that case was directly integral to the surveillance device or dropped from the sky.
Of course there is a common likely perpertrator in both the Lebanese and Iranian incidents, but the potential threat of an explosive device to reduce the evidence associated with the electronic eavesdropping remains whoever the perpertrator is.
I think there are also some intreresting deeper aspects to this, namely:
a. Is the purpose to deter searchers?
b. Or to destroy sensitive components? – if so what’s so sensitive that it needs destroying?
c. How would your design a surveillance device with an associated explosive payload so that it was certain to destroy the component you are concerned about.
d. What are the EOD implications of such a design.
Seperately, the fascinating accusations that Siemens components sold to Iran had small quantities of explosives (and presumably an initiation system) hidden within them is intruiging. Siemens deny even selling the components. But let’s guess that someone in the West provided a component with hidden micro devices in them for sabotage…. and that’s a fascinating concept.
Interesting article here about the psychology of “near misses”. It’s human nature to think that a project is a great success even if total disaster was missed by a fraction.
I think there’s an interesting corollary here for EOD operations. Most countries have an investigation system for examining when there’s an incident that kills or injures an EOD operator or bomb disposal technician. But if the operator is “lucky” and escapes unscathed there’s often no such investigation… and as the article points out, the individuals involved tend to repeat their potentially disastrous behaviour. To quote from the link “People don’t learn from a near miss, they just say “it worked, lets do it again.”” Ok ,there are the occasional exceptions, but on a global basis I think the statement there is no investigation of near misses is true as generalisation.
I’m fascinated that the FAA has addressed their problems in the area of “near misses” by analyzing the issues and pre-emptively fixing them so that there has been an 83% drop in fatalities over the past decade.
So… how do we collect and analyse the “near miss” data from EOD operations? (And you know that generally the answer is that we don’t). I think partly there is a culture in bomb techs globally to avoid such activity and partly there are frankly weak oversight structures over most EOD units. That’s provocative I know but I stand by what I’m saying – argue me back if you wish.
One of the facts quoted in the article is that a risk analysis firm suggests that there are between 50 and 100 “near misses’ for every serious accident. Instinctively I wouldn’t be surprised if that stat applies equally to EOD operations.
Most incident investigations of EOD casualties work backwards – I think it’s time the community turned this on its head and EOD organizations get used to trying to spot the near miss. I don’t doubt that would require a huge cultural shift, and collection and analysis of a lot of data but I think it’s needed.