I’m digging further into the cognitive processes used by EOD technicians. Let me be clear that I’m not suggesting that all EOD operators struggle, just that the process of threat assessment and RSP development can be tricky.

One of the things that some nations or organisations try to do is to reduce EOD into “decision trees”… i.e reduce the process of threat assessment and RSP development to an algorithm. This is an interesting process to participate in, fascinating, looks good on paper but invariably falls down in the field, in my humble opinion.  The mind is not a computer that processes information towards an end decision point – it is much more complex than that.   IED incidents are very complex things with too many variables for a decision tree. Reducing the mind’s process to a crude decision tree does not optimize the potential to make much more refined decisions in much more complex environments than algorithmic decision trees allow.

 An IED incident I think can be distilled as a puzzle (see below) to which 4 cognitive steps are applied

 1. Memory – information from training and intelligence from previous incidents or sources

2. Perception – the ability to order and understand data as they appear in front of you

3. Imagination – The ability to use the information/intelligence you have to see what might happen 

4. Decision making – what can be done to affect the future.

It seems to me that EOD operators fail, regularly in bad operators, indeed almost predictably, at functions 2 and 4.  But could that be improved by improving cognitive function 1 – Memory? And we improve memory by better training and better delivery of intelligence.  Improving training is a perennial activity – but how much work has been done to optimize the delivery of intelligence in forms that are better absorbed and understood?Modern technology allows intelligence to be delivered in all sorts of media – but I’ve never seen studies which review the optimal methods of delivering intelligence data.  This is an area that interests me greatly.

In my next blog I’ll discuss the different sorts of cognitive “memory” that we use and also make a personal point about EOD teams and the widely held concept of two heads are better than one when it comes to threat assessment – which I think is either wrong, or poorly implemented, or the dangers it provides are not recognised.

As ever comments are welcome.

One of the things that has bothered me over the years is why bomb techs sometimes make the wrong decisions.  In life we all make wrong decisions sometimes and generally no-one gets hurt. On bomb disposal operations that’s different and I think therefore worthy of examination.  Some of the implications to this clearly have broader application to wider “military” decision-making.  By studying decision making theories and reading papers I’m hoping for more insight into applications for the selection and training of EOD operators, and possibly techniques that operators can use to help validate decisions, or at worst to recognise what sort of decision they are making and why.

I do not claim to be a clever student of psychology but I’m reading into the subject quite hard. For those of you interested I would heartily recommend as a starter Dr Norman Dixons seminal work “On the psychology of military incompetence”.   This is a terrific read full of fascinating stories. The book describes “cognitive dissonance”  and fundamentally points out that when people are under pressure to make decisions , sometimes they “see what they wish to see” and make decisions accordingly.

I’m wading through other more recent papers dissertations and books on decision making theory and associated psychology and in truth for an amateur it’s a bit of a struggle for me to keep up – but it is interesting and is causing me to think hard. I am constantly trying to place academic theory in real life situations for EOD Operators. I’ve discussed this before on this blog (pages 9 and 10).

Currently I’m looking hard at something called narrative theory, which (if I understand it right!) describes how as humans we perceive our day to day existence in a narrative, story-telling, way. Readers will know already I’m attracted to story telling… We tend to make decisions that result in interesting happy endings and if we are making decisions on that basis while conducting an IEDD threat assessment, then that is a dangerous thing, unless we recognise that we are doing it.  The fundamental issue is this, as described as “the Puzzle” by Dr Lee Roy Beach in his book “The Psychology of Narrative Thought”:

First. How do floods of minute electrical discharges  in your sensory systems come together to form perceptions that you regard as real. In bomb tech language, “how is the data you absorb at the command post with regard to the IED 100m in front of you presented to you”

Secondly. How do you bring together all these discrete packages of information into a meaningful flow of subjective experience that gives rise to an understanding of how the situation developed in the past, what the situation is now and what expectations are in the future. In bomb tech speak – “What is your threat assessment?”

Thirdly. How do your expectations about the future give rise to decisions and  actions which affect the future.  In bomb tech speak “what is your RSP?

This is a complex area and too much for single blogs – I’ll trickle my thoughts through as my “reading in” continues. Comments very welcome.

There’s an interesting article here about how terrorists learn to make IEDs. Quite relevant in the light of the apparently poorly constructed IED in Times Square, New York a couple of weeks ago. Interesting concepts such as the difference between “Techne” (greek for “technical knowledge”) that is obtained by teaching and “Metis” greek for intuitive practical knowledge that is gained by experience.  Neither works on their own I guess. There are interesting implications here in terms of the ability for terrorism to transfer from say Afghanistan to the US homeland.  Interesting implications too in the sense that “home grown” terrorists understand the context better in their own homeland and have the “Metis” for conducting an operation better than, say, a guy sent from one country to another. Like – “Oh yeah, I know which shops sell peroxide….”  I think there are implications too to work I’ve done in the past in terms of predicting or at best characterising where roadside IEDs might be laid. There might be a characterised signature in that aspect between a “metis” knowledgeable man from a “techne” knowledgeable man.

There’s also a point that the “metis” of general criminality enables terrorism. Obvious when you think about it, but worth considering in that way.   This also explains why cops make good terrorist hunters when embedded with the military.  I suggest you read the article.

In an earlier post I discussed how the “gut” of a bomb tech makes intuitive decisions when dealing with a terrorist device that then, where possible,  needs testing by the head.  As I said, the brain sometimes is lazy testing intuitive decsions. Here’s another interesting example of that phenomena in a video.

My last few posts on Bomb disposal technician psychology with queries about how training might better address certain issues has caused some further discussion and digging. For now, I was pointed in the direction of Dr Ed Bundy’s dissertation which is a fascinating study of how EOD technicians learning preferences and “intelligence strengths” differ amongst a range of bomb technicians. Essential reading for anyone involved in EOD training development. As Ed warned me when he gave me permission to post the link, it’s a good few pages long, but I think well worth the effort. I think too it has broader applications in counter-terrorist training. More thoughts to follow.