Bimbashi Garland

Bimbashi Garland - The man who taught the Arabs about IEDs – a British Ordnance Corps officer and metallurgist.  Thanks to Leslie Payne for flagging this gentleman polymath to me.

Previous posts have detailed some of the remarkable polymaths who have played in the explosive field, like the Earl of Suffolk GC.  Major Herbert Garland OBE, MC FCS is another of these and it’s a remarkable story with real currency.   Herbert Garland was born in Sheffield in 1880. In the years before World War One he was employed as a government explosives expert as a superintendent at a laboratory in Cairo.  During this time his hobby was archeological metallurgy, and Cairo was certainly the place to follow that interest.

When the war started he joined the “Arab Bureau” along with TE Lawrence and a rag tag bunch of businessmen, spies, soldiers and intellectuals. The Arab Bureau’s role was a model of modern day irregular warfare and I’ll write about them more in the future. Basically they had a very broad remit to develop intelligence and undertake operations across the Arab world in support of Britain's war aims.  It was a model of fusion between military and political activity that is rarely seen. Lawrence of Arabia’s activities where just a part of their activity.  As an organization it wasn’t without its critics who saw them as a group of amateurish and incompetent pro-Arab dilettantes.  It's intruiging to me that quite a few of the Arab Bureau, including Lawrence, Garland and (the not famous enough) Gertrude Bell shared a common interest in archaeology. 

Garland became the Bureau’s explosive expert, despite a somewhat casual approach to explosive safety. He developed grenades and an improvised mortar systems to launch the grenades, which was used extensively at Gallipoli.  An image of Garland’s mortar is here

Garland also designed a range of IEDs used by Lawrence and Garland himself in the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. In fact it would appear Garland was doing this work well before Lawrence joined the Bureau. Garland planted the IED that derailed the first Ottoman train near Toweira station in 1917, using an improvised pressure switch mechanism.  Interestingly he built and emplaced his IEDs so that they would not be spotted by Turkish troops employed to check the line before a train ran.

Garland was an Arabic speaker and earned high praise as a teacher of his dark arts.  I rather like this quote from Lawrence of Arabia about the Ordnance Corps officer; Lawrence had travelled to Yenbo, the base of the Arab army under Feisal “where Garland single-handed was teaching the Sherifians how to blow up railways with dynamite and how to keep army stores in systematic order. The first activity was the better.”

In 1918 he was sent to Medina to accept the Turkish surrender.  Lawrence assessed Garland’s contribution to the revolt as “much greater” than his own.   Garland died in 1921, his health destroyed by the campaigns he fought in the Middle East – and it took his wife two years to claim a war pension, as at first the military pensions department refused to accept his illness was directly connected with the rigours of his wartime experience, riding with the Bedu across the deserts of Arabia.

I’m reminded of my favourite quote from The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, by T E Lawrence, and very possibly my favourite quote ever:

All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.

Garland like his colleague Lawrence, was a dreamer of the day. Sua Tela Tonanti.

Update on Tuesday, May 15, 2012 at 7:10PM by Roger Davies

There is some confusion over which Corps Garland was associated with. Some sources state Ordnance Corps, others RE. Even the RE ones suggest he was "working for the Ordnance department."  In truth for a civil servant, mobilised from Cairo in wartime and immediately assigned to a shady organisation like the Arab Bureau and initially given the nominal rank of Sgt, before he was later promoted to Captain but referred to as "Bimbashi" or Major, such things probably didn't matter to him and perhaps they shouldn't to us.  I note with amusement that the Ottoman general in charge of Medina, to whom he was sent to receive the Turk's surrender refused to do so to such a man of lowly rank. Eventually the Turkish General's staff, tiring of war, "arranged" for the General to be captured, then contacted Garland immediately to hand over the city.

Update on Tuesday, May 15, 2012 at 9:37PM by Roger Davies

Here's a link to some contextual stuff on the Arab Bureau.

Update on Wednesday, May 16, 2012 at 1:51PM by Roger Davies

The stuff above prompted me to try and find details of the "Garland Mine" that Garland designed and used, and later Lawrence used, for attacking trains on the Hejaz railway.  I was about to give up hope when I found a reference here  that states that the initiation system for the Garland mine was based on a trigger mechanism from a Martini-Henry rifle.

Now that's interesting because on this very blog three years ago I posted a diagram of a device discovered by my friend Ian Mills, a device used by the Boers to attack British trains in South Africa in the Boer war, that used "the trigger mechanism from a Martini-Henry rifle".

So it may be that Garland was copying (perhaps in part) a Boer IED design.   Small world.

Update on Wednesday, May 16, 2012 at 6:15PM by Roger Davies

I found that Garland at least wasn't a sapper.... phew.... : - )

His award of the MC was in the London Gazette in 1917, where he is detailed as a temporary Captain, (Special List) not affiliated with a Regiment or Corps. He got numerous decorations - an MBE, and later an OBE, and handful of buckshee Egyptian awards. :-)

I also have found reference that he was a "member of the Ordnance Corps" in Guernsey in 1906, but was serving in "the Cairo Arsenal" by 1910. Another reference suggest he was a Sergeant at one stage.... but it's not clear when.   My instinct at the moment, was that he was some sort of degree qualified civilian, working in munitions in some sort of lab/storage/development capacity, was mobilised as a Sergeant in Cairo in 1914 and subsequently commissioned as a "Special List" officer working directly for the Arab Bureau in Cairo, probaly due to his association with the bunch of archaeologists who formed the core of that organisation.

Price

A short story:

I was driving north from the heat of the Gulf of Mexico to the blood warm dust of a long Alabama road. The air was hot and hard and my head hung heavy, throwing a fever. I knew I was running from a wave, a wave that was catching me. I had seven more days of leave, days in the balance before I was due to fly, another tour in the heat, another tear in my heart, ripping and raw. High cirrus told of a storm.  The whispers were silky too, one minute close, the next from over the horizon. "Can you do it, can you stand? " Probing persistent and God I 'm scared. 

By midnight I'd taken the wrong turn, somewhere east of Tuscaloosa, as I looked for the town where I knew she'd be. I shivered again and shook my fever, pulled to the side to rest my eyes, and again the voice "Can you do it, can you stand".  The fear is near now as is the storm.

I dreamt feverish and raw. Cutting a wire, pulling a cap, scratching the dust, head turning and turning and looking and looking.  My dream teaches me that fierce flash in the face, the roar and nothing.   "Can you do it".  The heavy suit I wore, that encased me, squeezed my life, cruel and tight. Breath hard.  "Can you do it. Can you stand"

I woke with a jump, it was dark, jerking my head against the window. Hard. Cold sweat. I swear the voice was so close, so near, outside the car, here,  the voice of my father. Smeared window. Sick.

Ahead, a spit and a throw, someone stands by the road, a junction. Sudden wind pulls at trousers wrapped around thin, thin legs. Dust. Why is he standing there.?   But I know, now. I know. I know.

In a moment I'm next to the creature, now my father, now something grey, something else. Something beyond my mind, deliberately. It feeds my fear. Grows and nutures it, laughs at it, again, high.  Can you do it. I know I can't.  It knows I cant . The head turns, and turns further than it should, inclines down and whispers in my ear. I hear the deal, the story, the crossroads I have reached.  The language was foreign, unknowable, but I knew every silken phrase. I nodded and prayed as my soul was preyed upon. 

So now I'm six weeks in. Seventeen devices done, with clear fresh cold cold hands.  I do it , I'll stand. But I know in a few more months, the frozen heat of that crossroads will be revisited.

And I'll pay my price to the prince. 

Blowing up dead animals.... really

How many frozen cows do you need to blow up to make a hamburger...... news report 

From history , here's that famous whale - stick another couple of sticks of dynamite on there... and some more..... and some more.... here....   brilliant commentary.

Assessing threats of terrorism - cross post

Cross post here, on IMSL Insights : http://intelmsl.com/blog/2012/04/intelligence-analysts-are-irrational/

EOD Operators delude themselves

I’m returning now to the issue of the psychology of EOD operators once again.  This interesting paper published last year discusses “The Rubicon Theory of War” and is well worth a read.  Its focus is more on the strategic issues of war-making and the psychology of politicians, generals and the public.  The theory suggests that people are cautious and avoid war when it appears a long way off, but as war gets closer their estimates about the succeses which they will encounter in the war and its likely result improves, probably way beyond rational expectation. 

I’m wondering if there exists , sometimes, a more individual, tactical effect on the psychology of individuals in battle, and specifically within the mind of an EOD operator on a planned operation, i.e. one where there is time and planning activity to carry out in advance.   Does innate caution change as H-hour get closer? Is this simply a natural effect of knowing you have thought of everything and your planning is good? Or is it simply a psychologically based falsehood?. I suspect it is both and difficult to tell the two apart.  I certainly recall operators who were a little perturbed at the beginning of planning an operation and who were much more confident even if I thought their plan was less than perfect. Also, intriguingly I never remember feeling too much concern on those planned ops I did myself. But I am now old and addled of mind and it was a long time ago.

Now, there’s an issue here to dig into.  As a commander I wanted my operators to be confident. I didn’t want to see over-cautious, unsure, tentative operations. There’s nothing worse for the units the EOD team is supporting than to see their EOD operator being unsure and lacking confidence. On more than one occasion I had to sit down with unit commanding officers and either move an operator or try and protect him from a commander who thought he wasn’t on top of things.   But at the same time I wanted that confidence to be justified, and I wanted an operator to put up his hand and say “Hang on, its not as straight forward as that,”when it came to pushy commanders asking too much. Once I was even banned from a brigade area (only for a couple of hours!) by a 1 star who thought I was not supporting his aims and as he called it (wrongly) spreading alarm and despondency amongst senior policemen over a specific operation. It took a few phone calls to close that one out , I can tell you.

The Rubicon Theory suggests there are two mind sets – firstly “deliberative” which dominates during the pre-decisional phase. It’s cautious and tentative and should prompt detailed planning when various courses of action are considered and compared.  This switches to “implemental” once decisions are made.  That’s fine too, but the danger to EOD operators is that the implemental mind-set is liable to override new information as it comes in and tends to assume that planned EOD actions will be successful.   I see almost a parallel here with earlier blogs comparing the “thought-through” approach with the “instinctive” approach, that matches the constructed complex render safe procedures developed for a planned op with the SOP, rapid deployment “drills and skills” approach sometimes needed on higher tempo operations. As ever, the difficulty is separating the two, and knowing when to use one or the other.   If we have SOPs that we automatically use in certain scenarios, by God we should be confident in them.

The authors of the paper describe something interesting. People in “implemental” mind sets are much less open and receptive to new information that perhaps they should pay attention to. Instead (and this is important) they seek information that supports the choice they have already made.  I think that’s something that every EOD operator (and intell analyst) should avoid doing, whatever the scenario.  Looking back, frankly, it’s a failure I myself was guilty of on certain operations and I can now recall seeing it on others, although I was probably too dumb to see it as such, back then. 20/20 hindsight can be a sickening thing.  Implemental mind sets are over optimistic, and although EOD operations must activate implemental activity at some stage we need to guard against the weaknesses it generates. I suspect the key once again , is to recognise when a planned EOD action hasn’t done what you expected and be able to re-think from there. I sense that’s where things can go wrong if not grasped or recognized at that stage, but I won’t give examples for offending the living!

Suffice to say that this paper is a good read for EOD operators – take out the strategic war fighting examples the paper uses and insert your own tactical EOD experiences. It’s startling stuff.